Name: Understand China’s India strategy: Nibbling territory isn’t the point of it. It is to condition India’s mind and tie its hands
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Understand China’s India strategy: Nibbling territory isn’t the point of it. It is to condition India’s mind and tie its hands

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+We use cookies and other tracking technologies to provide services in line with the preferences you reveal while browsing the Website to show personalize content and targeted ads, analyze site traffic, and understand where our audience is coming from in order to improve your browsing experience on our Website. By continuing to browse this Website, you consent to the use of these cookies. If you wish to object such processing, please read the instructions described in our / .AcceptRejectFROM TOI PRINT EDITIONFacebookTwitterLinkedinEmailWhen the Doklam standoff ended in late August 2017, no one entertained any illusions that the fundamental causes behind the confrontation had been removed. Recent events in the Galwan valley, where 20 Indian army personnel and an undisclosed number of Chinese troops lost their lives, have confirmed that view.Where there is disagreement is on what those fundamental causes of conflict really are. At the time of Doklam, many saw in the conflict a dangerous gambit to control the south plateau and eventually the access to the Siliguri corridor. I argued in a book published in 2019 that China had a much larger goal. At the time Beijing had entered a critical stage in its grand geopolitical strategy, and India had become an obstacle.One month before the Doklam standoff, China had gathered about 30 national leaders at its first summit devoted to provide guidance for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – a vast project aimed at creating a new Chinese world order. India announced just one day before the event that it would not be participating, explaining that in its current form the BRI will create unsustainable burdens of debt, while one of its segments, the economic corridor linking China and Pakistan, goes through the disputed areas of Gilgit and Baltistan and therefore ignores Indian core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity. The decision was received with foreboding in Beijing. In my view, Doklam was a direct response to the Indian move against the BRI.Something similar happened this time. In the weeks prior to the first Chinese troop movements in Ladakh, India had attempted to deepen its strategic relationship with the United States and Japan. More ominously, it had openly declared its intention to attract manufacturing away from China, now that the country appeared vulnerable to the coronavirus epidemic and the growing trade tensions with America. On May 19, the Chinese Global Times wrote: “Tensions between China and the US are not an opportunity for India to attract relocating industrial chains, because the South Asian country is not prepared to receive such a manufacturing shift given its poor infrastructure, lack of skilled labour and stringent foreign investment restrictions.”It is tempting to link events in the Galwan valley to local considerations. Its proximity to the vital road link to Daulat Beg Oldie is no doubt important, but Beijing does not make decisions of this importance in abstraction from more general goals. China continues to see India as a major obstacle to its global plans. If anything, the consequences of the original Indian decision to oppose the BRI continue to reverberate. Other countries have followed Delhi and opposition to the initiative grew very considerably in the years after Doklam. An ambitious and successful India, capable of directly rivalling Chinese economic power, would constitute a death knell for the project.The strategy is to create a war psychology. If China wants to stop India from taking certain decisions contrary to Chinese interests, it can achieve this by raising the risk of kinetic conflict. If Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his inner circle come to believe that war can follow upon their decisions, they will be increasingly reluctant to act and/or even become paralysed. In large measure, this is a subtle and repetitive exercise in psychological conditioning.I have read and heard numerous pronouncements in recent days on the possible impact of the Galwan massacre – the “moonlight massacre”, as some have dubbed it – on Indian public opinion. It is true that perceptions of China will grow even more negative than they already were, and trust will not be regained in the near term, but that misses the point. World politics is not a popularity contest. What matters is the capacity to decide and to act. India needs to be very careful to avoid coming out of recent events with its political capacity impaired.Next time a decision is being considered in the economic or political sphere that may displease Beijing, many voices around Modi will advise caution. No one wants to be in the position of dealing with a new incursion of Chinese troops across the border. These same voices will likely push for a more active posture in all four sectors of the border. This gets things exactly wrong. If it wants to avoid falling into the strategic trap that has been laid for it, India needs to de-escalate tensions at the border while increasing activity where the real game is being played: in the Indian Ocean, in the race to develop the key technologies of the future, and in the battle to control critical infrastructure.The first and most important lesson in the “new great game” is not to be distracted from the main prize. The second lesson is to preserve your margin of action.Those who consulted the Chinese press over the last week must have noticed an interesting fact: The recent battle between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh was nowhere to be seen. The possibility of war was not created and managed for domestic consumption. It was created for the Indian mind, a strategy of war psychology.FacebookTwitterLinkedinEmail{{#totalcount}}{{{short}}}{{#more}}{{/more}}{{/totalcount}}{{^totalcount}}Start a Conversation{{/totalcount}}{{{add_comment_link}}}{{#totalcount}}{{{read_comment_link}}}{{/totalcount}}Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.OpinionsInterested in blogging for timesofindia.com? We will be happy to have you on board as a blogger, if you have the knack for writing. Just drop in a mail at with a brief bio and we will get in touch with you.Please note:TOP VOICESTOP EDITORIALS

+We use cookies and other tracking technologies to provide services in line with the preferences you reveal while browsing the Website to show personalize content and targeted ads, analyze site traffic, and understand where our audience is coming from in order to improve your browsing experience on our Website. By continuing to browse this Website, you consent to the use of these cookies. If you wish to object such processing, please read the instructions described in our / .AcceptRejectFROM TOI PRINT EDITIONFacebookTwitterLinkedinEmailWhen the Doklam standoff ended in late August 2017, no...

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Understand China’s India strategy: Nibbling territory isn’t the point of it. It is to condition India’s mind and tie its hands

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